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The Impact of Early Commitment on Games 
Played: Evidence from College 
Football Recruiting 
Jesse Bricker* and Andrew Hansont 
We use data on athletic scholarship acceptance decisions to show that high school football 
players signal their ability level by delaying commitment. Although colleges can obtain 
information about student athletes, National Collegiate Athletic Association regulations limit 
information flow, making private information an important component of the scholarship 
market. Using ordinary least squares, censored regression, and negative binomial estimation, 
we show that for a given observed ability level, committing to a scholarship offer early is 
associated with less playing time after acceptance. In one season and at a typical average early 
signing date, early-committing athletes played in 0.21 fewer games per season, or about 4% of 
the average number of games played. 
JEL Classification: D82, L83 
1. Introduction 
Information asymmetries are common in social and economic transactions between 
two parties. Economic agents may have the opportunity to signal positive private 
information by taking on extra costs, for example, by delaying action (Tracy 1987; 
Kennan and Wilson 1989; Conlin 1999; Conlin and Emerson 2003) or by taking on higher 
mental costs (Spence 1973). Typically researchers examine signaling behavior in adult 
decision makers, some of whom may be highly educated or have experience with 
bargaining. I 
We add to this literature by testing for signaling behavior when the economic agent is 
arguably less sophisticated. Specifically, we test for signaling of private information by high 
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© Southern Economic Association, 2013 971 
972 Jesse Bricker and Andrew Hanson 
school student athletes when committing to attend a university on a football scholarship.2 
Universities covet highly skilled football players because a successful college football team can 
earn a university millions of dollars annually; in fact, Brown (1993) estimates a premium college 
football player generates over $500,000 in annual revenue.3 
We model a student athlete's decision to accept a scholarship based on a signaling model 
where players have private information about their ability. The model demonstrates that high-
ability athletes are able to signal private information by delaying commitment to a university 
scholarship. The model implies that players who delay initial commitment to a university will 
be higher ability ex post than players who commit early. 
We test the signaling hypothesis using data on high school athletes from Rivals.com, a web 
site that follows high school football recruiting.4 Our results indicate that, for a given observed 
ability level, student athletes committing early garner less playing time in subsequent seasons than 
those who delay initial commitment. For example, using our estimates from the 2004 season, 
athletes who commit at a typical average early signing date play in 0.21 fewer games, which 
represents roughly 4% of the average number of games played (5.90) by our sample in 2004. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the recruiting 
process and details of high school athlete commitment decisions. In section 3 we demonstrate a 
simple separating equilibrium model of a high school athlete's commitment decision. Section 4 
describes our data, estimating equations, and results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Recruiting Process 
College coaches spend a significant amount of time recruiting high school athletes. The success of a 
coach on the field often comes through the quality of the players that he is able to bring to a university. 
Kahn (2006) indicates that a coach's salary depends on his ability as a recruiter. Coaches identify talent 
through watching film of thousands of recruits playing high school football, or by watching the 
student's high school team play in person. Once a coach identifies a talented player, they will try to 
develop a relationship with the player in order to entice them to accept a scholarship offer. The coach 
will make frequent phone calls and will travel to talk to the family, friends, and coaches of the recruit. 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) regulates the recruiting process of 
high school football players. Each year in early February, on National Signing Day (NSD), 
universities may sign up to 25 football players to an athletic scholarship (teams may have 85 
scholarship athletes total).5 On NSD, student athletes sign binding National Letters of Intent 
(NU) stating their commitment to attend a school and play football. 
2 Higb scbool football players often get advice from their parents or higb scbool coacb who may have prior experience 
with former players making the same decision; however, the decision to commit to a scholarship is their own. 
3 The by-laws governing collegiate athletics prohibit universities from offering a wage to student athletes; the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) sets these by-laws. Kahn (2006) provides a general overview of the NCAA 
regulations in several other collegiate sports and examines the cartel-like characteristics of the NCAA. McKenzie and 
Sullivan (1987) argue that the NCAA is not a cartel. 
4 Over the last decade, the college commitment decisions of high school football players have become increasingly 
scrutinized and heavily followed. ESPN, a major sports broadcast network, regularly reports on the commitment 
decisions of t .. most highly regarded high school atWetes. 
5 If schools continually sign their limit of players annually, the total scholarship limit means schools must have attrition 
(25 X 4 > 85). Attrition is usually due to poor classroom performance or leaving school early to play professionally, 
though schools are able rescind a scholarship. According to NCAA legislation and governance circulated in 2009, the 
NLI only guarantees an athletic scholarship for one year; bowever, it is common practice to renew annually after the 
first year. 
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Recruiting for an entering freshman class begins early the previous year. Contact between 
a college coach and a high school student athlete is regulated and kept to a minimum for much 
of the process. 6 As a result, there is ample room for information asymmetries. Prior to NSD, 
contact with recruits is limited to one phone call per week outside of scheduled campus and in-
home visits, which can take place only during a certain period. Football coaches may view a 
recruit's high school practice and games only during limited time windows. 
The size of the athletics budget and the quality of the football program determine the 
number of recruits that a university will target. Large universities spend at least $100,000 and 
sometimes as much as $1,000,000 annually on recruiting of high school football players. For 
example, the University of Tennessee reported that it spent $900,000 on football recruiting in 
2007, while the University of Mississippi spent nearly $400,000. For comparison, of the 12 
teams in their athletic conference, the University of Mississippi budget ranked ninth (Feldman 
2007). 
In the absence of pay, a scholarship varies only by the quality of the education and quality 
of the football program. The quality of the coaching staff and the quality of the facilities will 
allow the athlete to become a better player; the exposure at a university will allow the athlete to 
showcase his skill to the public and to future employers in professional football leagues. Kahn 
(2006, p. 13) points out that "it is likely that NCAA rules on player compensation raise the 
[marginal revenue product] of effective coaches and the value of top quality facilities, since 
these become the primary means of attracting athletes." 
The maximum number of commitments per year is 25, but a school may offer scholarships 
to more than 100 players during a recruiting period. Schools offer many scholarships 
understanding that the probability of signing anyone player is low. This also means that a 
player knows that if he waits too long and 25 players have already committed, the scholarship 
offer may no longer be available. The scholarship offer is revocable, and, once offered, the 
school may lose interest in the player.7 
Although the offer is not contractually binding on either side until a recruit signs his NLI 
on NSD, many recruits announce their decisions early through a verbal commitment. It is 
relatively uncommon for recruits to change their college decision between announcing a verbal 
commitment and signing the formal contract, although it does happen.8 Typically, if a recruit 
changes his commitment decision it is because of coaching turnover at the university or a better 
opportunity arising. For the most part, recruiting stops once a player has signed his letter of 
intent. The penalty for transferring to another school after signing a NLI is for the player to sit 
out a season before playing for another school.9 
6 New forms of communication cause these rules to be in a constant state of flux . For example, because the NCAA did 
not explicitly prohibit sending text messages, some coaches sent multiple text messages per day to recruits (Feldman 
2007). The NCAA later explicitly prohibited text messaging (O'Neil 2008). Yen (2011) also provides further details on 
the NCAA recruiting process. 
7 Scholarships may remain open after NSD for the most talented players. Two recent examples are Terrell Pryor (class of 
2008) and David Oku (class of 2009). Three schools (Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State University, and the 
University of Michigan) kept a scholarship open for Terrell Prior until after NSD. Two schools (Syracuse University 
and the University of Tennessee) kept a scholarship open for David Oku until after NSD. Crabtree (2009) and Staples 
(2008) describe these stories. 
8 Staples (2012) finds that 12.4% of top football recruits made such a change in commitment. 
9 A player in our sample can transfer without sitting out a season if he transfers to a Football Championship Subdivision 
(FCS, formerly I-AA), Division II, or Division III school. The exposure at these schools is much lower than at a top 
FBS school. 
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3. Modeling the Commitment Decision 
This section presents a simple model examining the decision of a student-athlete to accept 
a scholarship offer to attend a particular university. The model assumes the student-athlete 
holds private information on their ability and reveals this information through the decision 
when to commit to accept a particular scholarship offer. The model derives a single crossing 
property that allows a separating equilibrium where a student-athlete with better private 
information makes a later commitment. Potential college student athletes may be especially 
likely to hold private information about their abilities considering the stringent rules the NCAA 
imposes on contact with coaches and the imperfect ability of coaches to judge young athletes. 
For an econometric model of the factors that recruits consider in the decision on what 
scholarship to accept, see Dumond, Lynch, and Platania (2008). 
Let i index the type of private information that the student-athlete holds. An increase in i 
is associated with a student-athlete holding more "positive" private information, which will 
make him a higher quality student-athlete. There are two time periods: the current time (T = 0) 
and a future time (T = t). At the current time, the student-athlete may commit to his most 
preferred scholarship offer and derive an expected utility S. Alternatively, the student-athlete 
can delay the commitment decision until time t. We assume that by time t, student-athlete i 
receives a more preferable scholarship offer with probability Pi, and Pi increases with i. The 
expected utility from the more preferred offer is Up, where Up > S. The cost of delaying 
commitment is C for student athletes with all types of private information. 10 
The private information type that is just indifferent between committing now and delaying 
commitment is type 1, so that C = Pie Up - S). Because the expected benefit from delaying 
commitment, Pi (Up - S), increases with i and the cost ~f delaying commitment does not vary 
with i, those with lower quality (private information) commit now ('if i < 1), and those with 
higher quality (private information) commit later ('if i > 1). The resulting separating equilibrium 
is based on the quality of private information held by the student-athlete and the fact that this 
information increases the probability a more preferred scholarship is offered. 
4. Empirical Tests 
We test for evidence of signaling using ex-post data on collegiate playing careers matched 
to data on the timing of the original commitment student athletes make to accept a football 
scholarship. Our prediction is that high-ability types will delay initial commitment, or that 
committing to a football scholarship early is associated with lower ability ex post. 
Our measure of ex post quality is the number of games an athlete plays in a football 
season. The primary reason for this choice is to have a uniform measure across position types. 
Some positions have measurable outcomes (e.g., for running backs, a measure of quality is 
number of times they touch the ball and number of yards they run for) whereas others do not 
(an offensive lineman has no specific quality measure). For all positions, playing in a game 
10 These costs are associated with the student-athlete not resolving the uncertainty in their decision resulting in stress. 
Modeling this cost as the probability a scholarship is withdrawn results in a separating equilibrium with similar 
empirical implications. 
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demonstrates higher quality than not playing. The data on the number of games student 
athletes play in come from College Football Stats.com (CFBstats.com). 
We measure the timing of commitment as the number of days prior to the NSD that a 
recruit commits to a university. We collect information on the commitment date of recruits 
from Rivals.com. 11 Figure 1 shows the distribution of scholarship commitments relative to the 
NSD. As shown in Figure I, many recruits (about 10% of our sample) wait until NSD to 
commit. 12 Rivals.com gathers information on the physical characteristics of student athletes, 
such as height, weight, and speed, and it ranks recruits according to a subjective measure of 
observed ability. 
The Rivals.com recruiting data start in 2002 with that year's freshman class and spans 
through the 2005 freshman class, for a total of four years. The game statistics data starts with 
the 2003 season, when the initial recruiting class is sophomores, and spans through the 2006 
season, one year after most of the initial class graduates. Table 1 shows how the recruiting class 
data correspond to the game statistics data . Our sample is limited to 66 major Football Bowl 
Subdivision colleges from the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) conferences: the Atlantic 
Coast, the Big 10, the Big 12, the Big East, the Southeastern, and the Pacific 10, as well as one 
unaffiliated university (Notre Dame).13 
Table 2 shows the general trend that players who delay commitment play in more of their 
team's games in a given season. The second column under each season (2003- 2006) shows the 
average number of days prior to the NLI deadline that a recruit gave his commitment to the 
school. In general, Table 2 shows that the fewer days prior to the deadline that a recruit gives a 
commitment, the more games he plays in for any given season. This is especially apparent for 
athletes who play in most of their teams' games. The average number of days prior to the 
deadline for athletes who play in 10 or more games is less than the sample average in all years of 
our data. The average number of days prior to the deadline for athletes who play in three or 
fewer games is more than the sample average (2005 being the exception). 
Ordinary Least Squares ( OLS) Estimation 
To formally analyze the link between commitment date and quality, we estimate the 
number of games played as a linear function of the number of days prior to the deadline, 
controlling for other factors, using ordinary least squares (OLS): 14 Our estimating equation is 
the following: 
Games) = CX+ PI (Days Pr ior)j + P2(Ranked = l)j + 
P3(Ranked = 1 x Observed AbilitY)j + P4(Home State)j +l1c + 8p + A/ +Ej . 
(1) 
The dependent variable is the number of games played in a given season for an individual 
player (j), from recruiting class (c) , playing position (P) , at school (£) . Days Prior is the primary 
11 Yahoo! acquired Rivals.com in 2007 for $100 million dollars, a testament to the heavy web traffic on the site. 
12 A commitment on the part of a recruit is changeable until NSD. We observe the day that a particular recruit declared 
. his intention to play for the school with which he eventually signed a NLI. 
13 See Appendix I for a list of schools in our sample. Our sample includes Notre Dame, despite not being affiliated with a 
BCS conference, because they receive special consideration for BCS bowl games. 
14 When using OLS to estin3ate ~ , we maintain assumptions that E is a mean zero random variable that is orthogonal to 
the covariates in the regression model. A further assumption of the OLS model is that E is homoskedastic. In practice, 
by clustering our standard errors at the school-by-recruiting class level we do not maintain this assumption. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Recruit Commitment Days Prior to Signing Day 
variable of interest and is the number of days prior to NSD a recruit makes a verbal 
commitment to play for the school where they sign a scholarship offer. We estimate separate 
regressions for each season we have games played data on. 
Ranked is a variable equal to one if Rivals.com ranks the student athlete by observed 
ability. Observed Ability is the national ranking of the player from Rivals.com (ranging from 1 
to 182, with I being the best ranking). Rivals.com ranks approximately 62% of high school 
student athletes in the sample. We use the subjective rank, instead of more objective measures 
of ability such as speed and strength, because different positions require unique abilities. For 
example, running speed is important for running backs but less so for defensive linemen, and 
the fastest defensive lineman is slower than the slowest running back. 
Table 1. Data Summary for Recruiting Classes and Game Statistics 
Game Statistics (Year) 
Recruiting Class 2003 2004 2005 2006 
2002 X X X X 
2003 X X X X 
2004 X X X 
2005 X X 
2006 game statistics include some players from the 2002 recruiting class; however, many of these players were 
already graduated or were no longer in college for other reasons. Players are eligible to play football for four seasons. 
Players are not required to play four consecutive years and may take a year to mature physically or recover from injury. 
It is common practice for players to do tills during their freshman season. 
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Table 2. Average Number of Days Signed Prior to National Signing Day, by Games Played 
2003 Season 2004 Season 2005 Season 2006 Season 
Games Played N Avg. Days N Avg. Days N Avg. Days N Avg. Days 
0 194 64 643 77 617 99 258 95 
1 196 73 156 93 168 78 133 97 
2 134 68 89 76 105 82 89 103 
3 48 94 84 77 103 73 83 99 
4 36 47 63 99 68 108 71 82 
5 37 60 83 85 84 66 75 79 
6 52 58 69 68 85 85 68 84 
7 55 66 69 78 119 81 101 72 
8 77 55 103 75 129 75 110 90 
9 74 50 112 64 187 74 115 97 
10 63 42 167 57 250 80 149 85 
11 92 48 358 56 619 70 240 82 
12 152 50 289 60 460 66 654 81 
13 135 42 68 59 107 80 688 83 
14 10 54 153 69 
15 4 27 
Total 1359 59 2353 71 3101 79 2987 85 
Home State is a dummy variable equal to one if the player makes a commitment to a 
school in his state of residence. The rationale for including this variable is that geographically 
close schools may be able to gain access to information about a recruit that other schools 
cannot. Finally, Yl measures recruiting class fIXed effects, e measures position fIXed effects, and 
').. is a school fixed effect. We create dummy variables for three types of football positions in our 
regression analysis: quarterback, "skill" positions (running back, wide receiver, cornerback, 
safety, linebacker, tight end), and linemen (both offensive line and defensive line).15 All 
specifications cluster standard errors at the school-by-recruiting class level. 
Table 3 presents estimation results for Equation 1 both with and without the Ranked and 
Ranked X Observed Ability variables. As shown in Panel A of Table 3, the negative relationship 
between the Days Prior variable and games played is strong in all years, controlling for 
recruitment class, home state, position, and school. The magnitude of the effect of signaling by 
delaying commitment on games played is substantial. In 2004 a student who committed 71 days 
prior to NSD (the mean in 2004) played 0.19 fewer games during the season . The 0.19 games 
magnitude represents 3% of the mean number of games played (5.90) in 2004. The Days Prior 
estimate is precisely estimated, standard errors are small compared to the point estimates, and 
the estimated effect is statistically significant at no less than the 10% level in all years. 
In Panel B of Table 3, we add the Ranked and Ranked X Observed Ability variables and 
reestimate. Adding these variables allows us to isolate unobserved ability by conditioning on known 
characteristics of the recruit at the time they make a commitment and shows the relative importance 
of observed and unobserved ability. It also allows us to get an idea of how omitted variable bias may 
be affecting our results. In Panel A, omitting observed ability biases the coefficient on Days Prior if 
these two variables are correlated and observed ability is correlated with playing in games. 
The primary results from Panel A in Table 3 remain largely unchanged after controlling 
for observed ability in Panel B. Controlling for observed ability, the signaling mechanism (Days 
15 We drop student athletes recruited as punters and kickers from the sample. 
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Prior) is as economically and statistically significant as in Panel A. Using the 2004 estimates, a 
student who commits 71 days prior to NSD plays in 0.21 fewer games during the season, or 
roughly 4% fewer games relative to the mean of S.90 games played (see Appendix 2). 
The measure of observed ability (national ranking) predicts that highly ranked student 
athletes (ranked closer to 1 than 182) play in more games. In 2004 a top-ranked athlete is 
expected to play in roughly two more games relative to an unranked athlete. An athlete at the 
mean national ranking plays in I. IS more games than an unranked athlete, or roughly 20% of 
the average of S.90 games played. The magnitude of unobserved ability on games played 
(PI x Days Prior/ Games) is roughly 18% of the magnitude of observed ability on games played 
( { P2 (Ranked = I) + P3 (Ranked = I x Observed Ability) } / Games) at their respective means. Com-
parisons using 2003, 200S, and 2006 data and estimates yield similar conclusions (see Appendix 2). 
The ranking and observed ability effect is larger than the signaling effect; however, we still 
fmd considerable information in the Days Prior (signaling) variable. Finding a strong effect for 
unobserved ability after controlling for observed ability reinforces the usefulness of thinking about 
the commitment decision as a market where signaling occurs. By delaying commitment, recruits 
are able to signal a factor that colleges cannot observe, and this factor is important enough to 
explain ex post quality. Assuming that the observed ability variable sufficiently controls for 
football skill, this factor represents private information about the student athlete that matters for 
playing in games. Examples of unobserved ability could include work ethic, ability to grasp more 
complex playing schemes, effort to stay academically eligible, and ability to prevent injury. 
Alternative Estimation 
The nature of our dependent variable, games played, deserves further consideration. 
Games played is both bottom censored (at zero) and top censored (at the maximum number of 
games played by a team). It is also a count variable, rather than a continuous variable. An OLS 
regression may not be appropriate for either of these reasons, so we supplement our OLS 
estimates with count and censored regression models. 
The negative binomial model (a nonlinear count data model) provides consistent and 
efficient parameter estimates when the dependent variable (y) is a count and E[Ylxj < V[Ylx] . 
The negative binomial model assumes that the observed dependent variable is generated by a 
process that mixes the Poisson and gamma distributions. The conditional density of Y is thus 
with mean parameter Ilj = E[yjIXj] =ex;~ to be estimated. Here ro is the gamma distribution and 
(J. is the dispersion parameter. 16 The log likelihood function is maximized and solved to find pNB. 
If the dependent variable (games played) is a proxy for the latent and true but unobserved 
variable (games played*) (where games played* can be less than zero and greater than the 
maximum number of games), then a censored regression model is appropriate. The observed 
games played variable cannot differentiate between a player who should truly have zero games 
16 If ex is zero, then the model collapses to a Poisson distribution; if ex is positive, then the data are overdispersed 
(E [Ylxj < V[Ylxj) and an alternative to the Poisson is appropriate. Our estimates of ex in Table 4, Panel B, are positive. 
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Table 3. Test of Early Commitment on Games Played (OLS) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 
Panel A. Does not include national ranking 
Days prior to -0.0023* -0.0026** -0.0017* -0.0020* 
National (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Signing Day 
Observations 1317 2273 3002 2893 
R2 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.11 
Panel B. Includes national ranking 
Days prior to -0.0024* -0.0029** -0.0020** -0.0023** 
National (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Signing Day 
Ranked = 1 2.021 ** 2.096** 1.395** 1.208** 
(0.414) (0.278) (0.242) (0.281) 
Ranked = 1 X -0.023** -0.019** -0.011 ** -0.010** 
Observed (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ability 
Observations 1317 2273 3002 2893 
R2 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.11 
All regression models include dummies for year of recruitment, position played, school , and whether the student 
attended a home-state school. Standard errors are clustered at school-recruiting class and are reported in parentheses. 
• Significant at the 10% level. 
• • Significant at the 5% level. 
played and one who should have negative games played. In this case, games played is censored 
at the tails and OLS may not be appropriate. Thus, we also estimate a double censored model 
based on Equation I to account for the censored nature of our dependent variable: 17 
for each athlete} in school s and year t : 
{
Equation 1 if 0 < Gamesjts < max (Gamests) 
Gamesjts = 0 if Gamesjts:O;; 0 
max (Gamests) if Gamesjts ~ max (Gamests) 
We reestimate Equation 1 using both censored and negative binomial regressions; Panel A 
of Table 4 presents the censored regressions, and Panel B of Table 4 presents estimates from 
the negative binomial model. Qualitatively there is little difference between the alternative 
results and standard OLS. 
In the censored regression, the impact of committing one day earlier is playing in 0.0031 to 
0.0048 fewer games, which implies that an athlete committing on NSD plays in 0.18 to 0.41 
more games than an athlete that commits at the average number of days prior to NSD 
17 Because some schools (s) play more games in a year (/) than others, our censoring is school and year specific and may 
vary across observations. We use the cnreg (censored normal regression) command in Stata (which is qualitatively 
similar to the Tobit model but allows tbe upper limit censor value to vary across observations) ill our estimates. Thus, 
errors are assumed to be normally distributed and estimates are derived via maximum likelihood estimation . In tbe 
censored model , the number of games played (Games) is observed, but the latent variable (Games/) is unobserved. 
Players can sbow their quality (lack of quality) by playing in more (fewer) games. However, in reality a player can play 
in no less tban zero games and no more than 15 games. 
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Table 4. Test of Early Commitment on Games Played (Censored and Count Models) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 
Panel A. Double censored 
Days prior to - 0.0031 * - 0.0043** -0.0048** -0.0048** 
National (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
Signing Day 
Ranked = 1 2.795** 4.357** 2.311 ** 2.192** 
(0.591) (0.547) (0.458) (0.517) 
Ranked = 1 X - 0.031 ** -0.042** -0.017** -0.018** 
Observed (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ability 
Observations 1317 2273 3002 2893 
Pseudo-R2 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.03 
Panel B. Negative binomial 
Days prior to -0.00055 -0.00040 -0.00035* -0.00027** 
National (0.00036) (0.00027) (0.00018) (0.00012) 
Signing Day [-0.0034] [ -0.0024] [-0.0024] [-0.0025] 
Ranked = 1 0.3414** 0.4565** 0.2685** 0.1472** 
(0.0763) (0.0621) (0.0438) (0.0305) 
[2.075] [2.692] [1.862] [1.339] 
Ranked = 1 X -0.0038** - 0.0043** -0.0021 ** -0.0011 ** 
Observed (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Ability [- 0.0232] [ -0.0251] [-0.0147] [-0.0100] 
Observations 1317 2273 3002 2893 
Pseudo-R2 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 
All regression models include dummies for year of recruitment, position played, school , and whetber the student 
attended a home-state school. Standard errors are clustered at school-recruiting class and are reported in parentheses. In 
Panel B, tbe average response across athletes is reported in brackets. 
* Significant at tbe 10% level. 
** Significant at tbe 5% level. 
(Appendix 2). As in the OLS results, the magnitude of unobserved ability on games played is 
between 13% and 30% of the magnitude of observed ability. 
The regression coefficients from the negative binomial model are presented in Panel B of 
Table 4. Unlike the linear model, the coefficients themselves do not reveal the impact of a one-
unit change in the covariates on games played; rather, these estimates need to be scaled by 
exp(x;~NB), and the marginal impact varies across individuals (J) . The "average response" across 
individuals is a general and concise estimate of this marginal impact, and it is summarized by 
~~By for variable k in the ~NBmatrix (Cameron and Trivedi 2001). The average response is 
presented in squared brackets in addition to coefficient estimates in Panel B bf Table 4. 
The negative binomial model predicts that an athlete committing on NSD will play 
between 0.17 and 0.21 more games than an athlete committing at the average number of days 
before NSD, a result that is similar to the OLS estimates (see Appendix 2). The negative 
binomial model also predicts that the average ranked player will play in roughly one fewer 
game than a top ranked athlete. 
A final concern with using the number of games a student-athlete played in as the 
dependent variable is that it may be a noisy measure of quality. There are many reasons a 
student-athlete may play in a game, for example, injury, poor performance of teammates, or 
substituting for starting players when the outcome is no longer in question. With this in mind 
we estimate Equation 1 using other measures of quality. As an alternative, we measure quality 
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by how many points a player scores and how many yards they gain in a game. These results also 
show delayed commitment to be a sign of quality: Players who sign earlier score fewer 
touchdowns and have fewer yards. These results (available from the authors upon request) 
include only subsamples of offensive skilled players, so the number of observations is much 
smaller, which unfortunately makes them quite statistically imprecise. 
5. Conclusion 
The regulations on contact between a college coach and a high school student athlete 
allows for information asymmetries during the recruiting process. In the context of o·ur model, 
our empirical results support the idea that student athletes are able to signal private 
information about their ability by delaying commitment to a university. We fmd athletes who 
commit to a university earlier garner less playing time in subsequent seasons than those who 
delay initial commitment. At a typical average early signing date, early committing athletes play 
in 0.21 fewer games. The magnitude is close to 20% of the size of the estimated impact of 
observed ability, measured at the mean. Our results demonstrate that signaling exists in an 
instance where the economic agent is arguably less sophisticated than previous studies and for a 
transaction prohibiting monetary exchange for services. 
Appendix 1. Colleges in Our Sample 
Alabama 
Arizona 
Arizona State 
Arkansas 
Auburn 
Baylor 
Boston College 
California 
Cincinnati 
Clemson 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Duke 
Florida 
Florida State 
Georgia 
Georgia Tech 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Iowa State 
Kansas 
Kansas State 
Kentucky 
LSU 
Louisville 
Maryland 
Miami (FL) 
Michigan 
Michigan State 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Mississippi State 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
North Carolina 
North Carolina State 
Northwestern 
Notre Dame 
Ohio State 
Oklahoma 
Oklahoma State 
Oregon 
Oregon State 
Penn State 
Pittsburgh 
Purdue 
Rutgers 
South Carolina 
South Florida 
Stanford 
Syracuse 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Texas A&M 
Texas Tech 
UCLA 
USC 
Vanderbilt 
Virginia 
Virginia Tech 
Wake Forest 
Washington 
Washington State 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
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Appendix 2. Magnitudes of Estimated Coefficients 
(I) (2) (3) (4) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 
Panel A. Means 
Games played 6.08 5.90 6.94 9.10 
Days prior to NSD 58.49 70.93 79.72 85.43 
RankinglRanked = I 46.31 49.60 47.78 48.21 
Panel B: OLS regression 
Marginal effect evaluated at mean of: 
Days prior to NSD 
- 0.14 - 0.21 - 0.16 - 0.20 
RankinglRanked = I 0.97 1.15 0.85 0.75 
And as a percentage of mean games played 
Mean days prior to NSD 2 4 2 2 
Mean ranking 16 20 12 8 
Panel C: Censored regression 
Marginal effect evaluated at mean of 
Days prior to NSD 
- 0.18 - 0.30 -0.38 - 0.41 
RankinglRanked = I 1.34 2.29 1.49 1.32 
And as a percentage of mean games played 
Mean days prior to NSD 3 5 6 4 
Mean ranking 22 39 21 14 
Panel D: Negative binomial regression 
Average response evaluated at mean of 
Days prior to NSD 
- 0.20 - 0.1 7 -0. 19 - 0.21 
RankinglRanked = I 1.00 1.45 1.16 0.86 
And as a percentage of mean games played 
Mean days prior to NSD 3 3 2 
Mean ranking 16 25 17 9 
Coefficient estimates from each ;egression model are evaluated a, the mean. For the ranking, the evaluation is 
conditional on being ranked: ~,""ked + \~,a"ked~ I "anking X ranklranked = 1) . Recall that observed ability and ranking are 
interchangeable. 
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